Introduction
The independence of central banks has an effect on the macroeconomic results of economies and ultimately on inflation 2 . A similar relationship may exist between budget institutions and the fiscal performance of governments. Budget institutions may have a bearing on fiscal results. 3 There is evidence that indicates that budgetary procedures favoring a stronger position of the budget authority vis-a-vis other members of government, or giving more power to the executive lead to greater fiscal discipline. 4 Eichengreen has found that "a number of measures of balanced-budget restrictions are significantly associated with larger surpluses (smaller deficits)" 5 in the state fiscal accounts in the United States. Poterba observed that rules and political factors, such as the control of one party over the state legislature are important in explaining differences in fiscal performance between different states in the United States. 6 Basically, the premise is that rules and regulations that give the executive more power vis-a-vis parliament will render smaller deficits. Similarly when the budget authorities are given institutional tools to deal with intra-government conflicts during the preparation of the budget and to control the appetite of the spending ministers smaller deficits may ensue. The same applies to strict rules governing the execution of the budget in the sense that when the government is not given a lot of flexibility to change budgetary items or to increase expenditures beyond the original authorization of Congress, presumably the fiscal results will be more conservative when compared with budget regimes in which governments are allowed to move more freely. Budget transparency will support better results because it fosters accountability; and the universality of the budget --no off-budget items--will render more fiscal discipline.
In the same line of thought, it is possible that formal fiscal restraints such as balanced-budget rules, when binding, or automatic links with taxation that force Congress to increase taxes when the expected deficit is large, will cause smaller deficits (larger surpluses). Coalition governments are particularly adept at increasing the budget and strong governments are more likely to solve budget deficits than weak or divided governments. 7 Moreover, when the budget is prepared in conjunction with a macroeconomic program and the budget size and composition is subordinated to the achievement of macroeconomic goals, the fiscal outcome may be more conservative. Finally, it should be noticed that when the budget institutions and controls for the state and local governments are weak, the autonomous spending and indebtedness of lower levels of government may contribute to greater deficit spending. In Colombia, it can be observed that several of these rules and regulations are present and that the system has been gradually developing starting about the middle of the last century, and very intensely since 1985. Possibly, these institutions and the prudent fiscal policy they foster made it possible for Colombia to exhibit a remarkable record of fiscal stability in the continent (Figure 2) which has similar reflections in terms of stable growth and stable predictable inflation 9 . In the next section it will be analyzed how these institutions came into effect in the context of the economic history of the country. But first, it is necessary to spell out the nature of these Colombian institutions and procedures. Relative to Congress, the executive is fairly powerful when it comes to the discussion and the legislative approval of the budget. Congress has been given legal deadlines for approving the budget. If the budget is not voted or not approved, the originally presented budget proposal of the government will automatically become the new budget. Congress is required to note first, separately, on the size of the budget and then on its composition. It is not allowed to increase expenditures --aggregated or line items --or to reduce revenues without the express authorization of the Minister of Finance.
A budget can be approved when the revenues and expenditures are not in equilibrium, but when there is a deficit, the government should propose a tax increase to Congress to cover the fiscal gap. If the tax increase is not approved, government can unilaterally cut expenditures to achieve equilibrium. Under normal conditions, except in the case of war or "socio-economic emergency", the government is not allowed to increase expenditures beyond the budget originally approved by Congress, without going back to parliament for the approval of such increases. When it invokes a state of emergency, this decision will be reviewed by Congress and by the courts, to prevent misuse of the emergency powers. There is not a lot of flexibility for changing expenditure items but the government can reduce the actual expenditures because it has an iron grip on the cash flow --the Finance was made responsible for the presentation of the budget to Congress. The approved budget was to be regarded as a maximum level of expenditures which could not be exceeded. Expenditure items were to be specific and not indefinite, and the debt service had priority over any other expense.
This initial regulation was refined in 1851 under the stewardship of Secretary Murillo Toro, (Law 14, June of 1951). During the period 1851-1892, the budgeting procedures were contained in the fiscal regulations and although these were subject to numerous reforms, responding to several financial crisis, the first modern organization of the budgeting process did not appear until 1892 10 , in the midst of a crisis provoked by large increases of the monetary base induced by the money financing of the budget. 11 This first "organic budget law" (Ley 33, October of 1892) contained a balanced-budget rule and made the Secretary of the Treasury responsible for suppressing expenditures until they equaled revenues. It also introduced the requirement that all expenditures contained in the budget proposal and in the final budget law approved by Congress must be expressly authorized by a pre-existing law.
Before this law was issued, the new Constitution of 1886 had laid out the general basis for the budget process: (1) No public expenditure could be made without having been approved by Congress or the legislative institutions of the lower levels of government; (2) each ministry could form its own budget proposal and send it to the Ministry of Finance who was responsible for the final project of the national budget and must submit it to the approval of Congress; (3) Congress must approve the expenditure budget and the means to pay for these expenses. This determined that the Ministry of Finance was the budget authority and that Congress and the legislatures of municipalities and departments were responsible for the approval of the budget. However, the Constitution severely limited the power of the legislature in this process because it established that when Congress did not approve the budget for the year, the previously approved budget could be repeated; more importantly, it also established that the government could increase the expenditure budget if it judged that additional spending was absolutely necessary ("unavoidable") during the periods when Congress was not in session. To legalize these extraordinary expenditures, all that was necessary was that the Council of Ministers would authorize the additional expenditures, and that the Council of State would approve this act. When it reconvened, Congress was called to rubber-stamp these decisions.
This, clearly facilitated the increase in expenditures and induced government to wait for the recesses of Congress to increase the budget. It also gave the judiciary a legislative role that would become a vehicle for clientelistic corruption. This Constitution and its budgetary consequences prevailed, however, until a new constitution was approved in 1991, in which the possibility of executive approval of the budget was prohibited by stating that all expenses must be approved by
Congress. This has had and is expected to have a restraining effect on expenditure pressures after the budget is approved because a new negotiation with Congress is a costly proposition. The need to obtain a new Congressional authorization deters demands from the spending ministers and forces more transparency in the initial proposal that government presents to the legislature. Additionally, the need for more transparency in the budget approved by Congress demands new skills of the executive because the Congressional approval, for the first time in over two centuries, has become a relevant event. Before it was a meaningless ritual -lip service to democracy. Naturally, the spending approved by Congress will be escalating as they become aware of their new power.
Many of the reforms of the nineteenth century and some of those conducted during the early twentieth century were not implemented as a response to an imminent crisis or as a result of one.
They were introduced by reformist officials. Florentino Gonzalez and Murillo Toro, for example, viewed the budget reform as part of a wider set of economic reforms, seeking to induce dynamism into the export sector of the economy.
The 1886 budget legislature is part of a political counter-reform --the "regeneration" of 1886--which devolved power to the central government. The counter-reformers had the intention of promoting morality and social discipline and pursuing a greater role for the state. 12 The fiscal, monetary and financial reforms were geared to increase central government control and the efficiency of spending; and to rationalize the use of the very exiguous fiscal resources. Andes. The reforms were thus imposed from the outside and were motivated by the scarcity of resources and the desire to obtain foreign financing. 13 The Kemmerer mission drafted the new law ruling the formation of the budget and its execution and control. After it was approved by Congress, it set most of the basic principles for the management of the budget in Colombia until the present days.
This new law established that Congress cannot increase unilaterally the size of the budget and that any new expenditure to be included in the budget requires the previous approval of the executive.
This is an important step to strengthen the executive in the budget negotiations. Furthermore, the new law clearly established that loans could not be assimilated to revenues and required that current it necessary for the government to train and maintain technical staff capable of producing and understanding the data required by the IMF missions on a regular basis, using the format and methodology of the Fund. Initially, the central bank had the technology, but after several missions, these technical skills were diffused to Finance and Planning.
It was in this environment of higher programming skills that, a thorough reform of the budget regime was enacted (Ley 38, April of 1989, decreto 3077, December of 1989, decreto 411, April 1989 and decreto 2162, September of 1989). The government was given more power to limit the budget of the legislature and the judiciary, it was also given authority to set financial targets for the parastatals and to follow up on their financial performance. This extended the control of the fiscal authorities to the whole non-financial public sector.
The new law formally introduced an instrument of macroeconomic coordination of the budget --the financial plan--which covered the programming of effective operations for the whole of the public sector and called for consistency with an annual macroeconomic program. It required that this financial plan be compatible with an annual cash budget and with the targets of the monetary and exchange policies. In these new regulations, the budget was also en element of coordination with the medium and long-range planning of the government. These are all legal requirements but the end result of economic importance is that programming and budgeting have been integrated into the macroeconomic management as essential functions that have to be coordinated into an overall policy with those of other institutions. Curiously, in the past, budgeting had been a purely bureaucratic or accounting activity that formally complied with the legal provisions of the budget law and supervised the compliance of other public institutions with it. This is no longer so. The institutions have changed to become active participants of policy and decision-making. However, they are still very poorly equipped to deal with the problems of efficiency of public expenditures. Also, budgeting still is not considered an activity for economists but rather something akin to accounting. works of local importance. However, these funds increasingly had been used to finance their political campaigns and to foster a corrupt patronage system that gave excessive political advantages to the incumbents. Originally, the idea had been that Congressmen would become interested only in the amount allotted for these grants and that this would give the government a free hand during the approval of the rest of the budget once the size of the grants was settled. This proved to be correct, but the cost was that the budget approval process was contaminated by personal interest and that
Congress abdicated one of its main responsibilities in a democracy --the discussion and approval of the budget--in exchange for these grants.
However, outlawing the congressional grants did not calm the apetite for Apork-barrell@ funds of politicians and the willingness of executive officials to accomodate them. As it stands, the budget approval process is an open season for Apork@. Politicians seek regional projects and find ways to divert resources to policital targets. As a result, there are economists in Colombia who think that the formal prohibitions to allot small grants to congressmen will render larger deficits in the future and that having given up that mechanism to satisfy the clientelistic drive of Congress will be costly in terms of governance and fiscal stability. In fact, the system that operated before 1981 had a well defined division of labor and of resources. claims that industrialists, politicians and labor unions were quite distinct from each other and that they had separate realms of exerting influence. According to him, the budget did not favor the private sector but rather, it was spent in a fairly progressive way in programs that had some distributive consequences. 17 The portion of the budget taken by politicians for their own clientelistic programs was small, and the private sector carved the quasi-fiscal deficit of the central bank through its directed credit programs, but not the budget.. With the creation of an autonomous central bank that cannot lend to the private sector, pressures are mounting to obtain subsidies from the budget. Similarly, politicians are demanding Apork@ now that they do not have access to grants. Altogether, the system is progressing to a more participatory democracy, but it may become more costly until new rules are developed to deal with the new mounting pressures for greater expenditure.
Another important contribution of the new constitution was the deletion of the procedures for increasing the budget during legislative recesses which, in fact, gave the government and the Council of State legislative powers that did not contribute to fiscal restraint or to the independence of the judiciary.
It also eliminated all earmarking, except pre-existing earmarking for social expenditures, but required that the social expenditure would have priority over any other expenditure (previously, this priority was given to debt service) and that the social investment budget should always be a non-decreasing proportion of the total budget. These two rules should contribute to increase the budget size over time. So far, their effect has been negligible because of the creativeness of the staff of the Budget Director, but eventually they will become effective pressures on expenditure.
Regarding the distribution of social expenditures it called for rules of distribution that would take into consideration the relative needs and levels of destitution and also the fiscal performance and administrative effectiveness of the regions.
The Constitution took a very important step towards the financial decentralization of government and, consequently, of the budget. It required that every year, an increasing proportion of the budget would be allocated to finance the supply of services that would be the responsibility of departmental and municipal governments. Furthermore, it also ruled that the municipal governments should obtain a proportion of the current revenues of the government to finance social investment at the local level. This proportion was determined to be fourteen percent in 1993 and to increase to twenty-two percent of current revenues in 2002.
The law established that the proportion of the current revenues of the central government to be shared by lower level governments should ascend from thirty-four percent in 1993 to forty-two percent in the year 2002. The services that should be taken over by the lower levels of government are essentially education, basic health, water and sewage, police, local public works, environmental protection and recreation.
If local governments seriously take over these responsibilities and use the transferred resources to pay for them, the effect on the budget size should be negligible. But, it has been observed that the central government and the politicians do not want to surrender these functions because the whole structure of political clientelism controlled from the top was built on them. The basis for the old-order governance mechanisms was the provision of these functions by the central government.
This way, congressmen influenced the allocation of services, and government rewarded or punished local governments channelling more or less services to them. As a consequence, the central government is re-assuming the financing of some of these services in a way that smacks of recentralization and also creates an undue pressure on the budget because most expenditures have to be financed twice: once through revenue-sharing and then, a second time, through ad-hoc transfers to departments and municipalities to obtain political support. 18 Furthermore, the decentralization process may have adverse fiscal consequences because in the early stages of the transition from centralized to decentralized forms of government, it is unlikely that strong budget institutions develop at the local level pari-passu with decentralization.
At the end of 1994, Congress passed a law that set the new rules for the budget process under the Constitution of 1991. This law contains several innovative features that must be singled out: it introduces as basic principles of the budgetary process both the macroeconomic consistency of the budget and the need for the process to be self-regulating in the sense that when revenues increase above normal levels, due to a positive revenue shock such as a temporary boom, the excess revenues should not be immediately incorporated as current revenues but, rather, saved and gradually absorbed in later years. This gives government the possibility to save the proceeds of the new increase in oil production and to distribute this portion of current revenues to lower-level governments only when the revenues are gradually incorporated in the budgets of future years. In the first semester of 1995, another law was approved that makes this saving in an oil stabilization fund mandatory for revenues of the new oil fields. stewardship. 19 There are signs, however that prevent the taking of an overly-optimistic approach:
The absence of grants to quench the thirst of politicians, the detachment of politicians from the monetary base and the democratic reforms that prevent the executive from approving budget additions without congressional approval will require additional skills, both political and managerial from the Ministry of Finance. It is also possible that new rules and regulations -additional institutions -will be necessary.
However, a lot of progress can be shown after a ten-year period of institutional building that The first factor to consider is the relationship between deficits and inflation.. In Colombia public expenditures or deficits do not exhibit by themselves a demonstrable statistical relationship with inflation. Figure 3 shows the behavior of inflation and the primary deficit of the central government between 1950 and 1992; Figure 4 shows that of inflation and the non-financial public sector deficit from 1960 to 1992. No clear relationship between the public deficits and inflation can be discerned. 1 This is confirmed by other studies that have recently been published and does not appear to be a typical Colombian trait but rather a fairly general finding. 20 "Inflation and deficits show no simple correlation. But there is a long-run association between inflation and one means of deficit financing --money creation." 21 There is also evidence that the volatility of public deficits shows an association with the volatility of inflation, when the deficits are large in comparison to the size of the domestic financial markets. 2 The money financing of deficits can be linked to higher inflation rates. 22 When the public sector deficit --or the private deficit--is financed through money creation, it contributes to increase inflation. After 1994, this source of financing was sharply reduced and the practice was virtually abolished in 1991 with the new Constitution, eliminating a source of inflationary pressure. However, it was not entirely removed, because the central bank continued to use seniorage as a financing source for its own activities of money-market and exchange rate intervention.
There is public awareness in Colombia that when deficits grow beyond a relatively small threshold, the sources of financing required --central bank finance, external and domestic credit--generate other side effects that have negative macroeconomic consequences. As shown in figure 6 , when the deficit grows above normal historical levels its domestic financing becomes unusually large.
And Figure 7 indicates that attempts to finance the public deficit with domestic credit will induce sharp increases in the domestic interest rate. There is also a private sector fear that public expenditure will inhibit private investment because the country has lived more frequently under conditions of credit rationing that cause public spending to displace private investment than under conditions of capital abundance. "Public capital has had a negative effect on private investment (...) and the contribution of public investment to growth is highly uncertain" (Easterly. 1994. p.262) In other words, delaying or halting public investment has not had demonstrable negative consequences on growth. This is probably caused by the poor effectiveness of public spending, at any rate it has made the trade-off between adjustment and growth less relevant in the past history of Colombia.
There is a perceived strong relationship between the current account balance and the public deficit ( Figure 8 ). Also, there are strong links between the creation of public deficits and the appreciation of the real exchange rate. This is not only caused by the fact that government traditionally has imposed strict controls on private sector indebtedness and has monopolized the use of foreign credit but also because the deficit was partially financed through money creation and the demand expansion spills over to the external sector.
There is also a strong relationship between the size of the deficit and the flows of external credit ( Figure 6 ) and the trade balance. These two factors --fiscal deficit and foreign financing--contribute to the trade deficit in the same direction: An increase in the public sector surplus contributes to higher trade surpluses and a decrease in the foreign financing of the deficit has a similar effect . pp.257-259). Moreover, an increase in the trade surplus contributes to the depreciation of the real exchange rate (RER), whereas a decrease acts in favor of an appreciation. In this manner, greater fiscal deficits will indirectly cause an appreciation of the currency. Government spending in Colombia, on the other hand, has shown a positive relationship with the real exchange rate in the past --greater government spending as a percentage of GDP is associated with depreciation of the exchange rate (Easterly. 1994. p. 256). 4 expenditures by seeking to maintain the deficit at comparatively low levels, pushing up revenues each time that expenditures grow. When this rule is frequently adhered to, as has been the case of Colombia, the process becomes almost self-regulated because there is a limit to the increase of revenues through taxes, which puts a cap on the growth of expenditures.
This also acts as a powerful deterrent of deficit creation when the central bank is independent and if the availability of foreign credit is constrained from abroad. The government cannot overly depend on domestic credit, given the very strong relationship between public sector deficits and domestic interest and the negative consequences of high interest rates over stability and growth.
Private opinion makers react negatively to increases in the real domestic interest rate because they cause a drop in the ratio of private investment to GDP and ultimately affect growth. 23 The relationship between the real exchange rate and the public deficit is another powerful deterrent to deficit creation in Colombia, because of the existence of a very strong exporter lobby and due to the traditional overwhelming influence of the coffee producers and other exporters that are forever seeking higher domestic prices for their products and abhor the real appreciation of the currency.
Accordingly, in balancing the short-term political objectives with the long-run demands of economic management, the advantages of a conservative financial policy are clear to anyone willing to do the analysis because large deficits affect negatively all the variables that are the key elements of macroeconomic stability and economic progress --growth, private sector investment, inflation, real exchange rates and the trade balance. What still remains unclear is why the government has sought a policy that is sound and very rational in the long run without yielding to the short-term attractiveness of deficit spending. To answer this it is necessary to delve in the dominion of political economy. The preference shown for budget institutions and for economic rationality in the long run has to be a reflection of who really holds power in Colombia.
One aspect that must be understood is that the constituency of Finance ministers in Colombia are not the political parties, nor the public at large, but the relatively powerful and very vocal business associations. Another aspect that must be highlighted is that traditionally, the most powerful pressure group in Colombia has been the Federation of Coffee Growers, a combined business conglomerate and lobby that had the virtual monopoly of foreign exchange during many years and represented the interests of the principal producers of exported goods of the country. The other business associations are conformed either by exporters or by producers of export substitutes. There is no strong organization of consumers, and fortunately for Colombia, there is no powerful importer lobby, 24 nor or a well organized populist party. The left has been a confused focus of opposition to the traditional parties and has not ever had significant popular backing or influence over public opinion.
In economic matters, the opinion makers are predominantly the economic pressure groups, independent think tanks like FEDESARROLLO and individual economists. There is also a small economic technocracy that can apply peer-group pressure on the government. Given this mix of public opinion sources, there must be and there is a definite bias in favor of policies that do not cause large deficits. There also is strong public opinion pressure to avoid policies that may cause the real exchange rate to appreciate. This was not always so, but since 1967 it has been the rule. Furthermore, the private sector nearly always favors lower interest rates; and given the scarcity of foreign financing, there must be a strong preference for smaller public sector deficits and for positive trade balances.
Since those groups that would pressure for more populist policies do not have permanent political and public opinion representation, the policy mix that is rewarded in Colombia is macroeconomic prudence. Politically it has made sense for governments to have given so much weight to the creation and maintenance of strong budget institutions that prevent expenditure excesses by Congress and control executive indebtedness because the principal constituencies of economic policy gain from stable and prudent fiscal policies. The new Constitutional charter of an independent central bank put an end to its previous excesses as a source of finance of the public and members of the private sectors and has the same political constituency of strong fiscal institutions.
This political organization may be criticized for being unduly oligarchical in nature or for not letting other mechanisms of democratic participation flourish, but in purely fiscal terms it has been a blessing. It has facilitated Colombia's slow but steady transition from being one of the poorest countries in the continent to the middle-income status it enjoys since the seventies.
It is particularly interesting how the government and the organized business guilds have worked together to imprint a real exchange rate objective on fiscal policy. For example, in the past, the adjustment to positive shocks in the international coffee prices has been achieved more through fiscal means than through changes in the real exchange rate. Similarly, when coffee prices fall, domestic prices of coffee are sustained using fiscal resources of the National Coffee Fund. This helps explain why during long periods of time, the real exchange rate has moved independently of the international coffee prices. 25 Producers of export goods different from coffee and of import substitution goods have been shielded from the full appreciating effects of the international booms on the real exchange rate and have been able to grow and develop with relative independence of the variations in prices of the main export commodity. In the long run, this has made the country more resilient vis-a-vis external shocks through export diversification.
With all its merits, the government-business consensus that ruled in Colombia during the 1967 -1991 period, also had some costs, mostly in terms of inflation and growth. This is closely related to fiscal policy and merits some analysis: Although Colombia has had a stable fiscal policy, it has not been overly restrictive. As a rule, the government has chosen to generate moderate and stable deficits, producing surpluses only when extremely favorable external conditions would require so; and even in these circumstances, the surpluses also have been moderate. The rate of inflation also has been stable but moderately high. These policy results seem to reflect a national preference for the middle of the ground. A favorite Colombian aphorism says: "don't place the candle so far from the saint that it cannot be seen; nor so close that it will burn it." In economic policy, this has been the rule.
From the late sixties to the early nineties, Colombia had a nominal exchange rate policy that attempted to favor exporters: Through a crawling-peg mechanism, the nominal exchange rate was confined to a path determined by the expected domestic and foreign inflations. The rates of inflation were carefully monitored and forecasted on a monthly basis and the rate of devaluation was determined by this expectation. Forecasts and macroeconomic programming were based on a stable inflation assumption.
Additionally, the central bank financed the private sector through development credit schemes or by granting direct credit to firms in sectors that were depressed or in distress. These activities were wholly or partly financed through monetary expansion. The money base was carved and distributed by a Monetary Board that treated it as a budget to be allocated and disbursed; the growth of the base and M1 were carefully programmed so that the nominal exchange rate and the credit to the private sector and to government could be accommodated. The implicit programming rule was that M1
would grow at the same rate of the expected growth of nominal GDP, assuming stable inflation. The nominal exchange rate devaluation would be programmed accordingly targeting a stable real exchange rate. This made inflation and devaluation easily predictable and it became a self-fulfilling rule. The accommodation with higher inflation was started in the early seventies and continued until 1991. The Pastrana government narrowly had won the presidential election of 1970 and sought to gain public support through expanded public expenditures and higher quasi-fiscal credit subsidies.
With time, the government and the public came to a tacit agreement: If inflation was kept around twenty-four percent per year in a band that would not exceed thirty percent, the public would not seek to reduce their monetary assets. The government also tolerated the indexation of nominal contracts and eventually accepted a form of indexation of wages, by yearly adjusting the minimum wage to the past inflation. 26 Given these mores of monetary management and in view of the strong pressure to keep the exchange rate from appreciating, it is a small wonder that Colombia has one of the most remarkable records --stable moderate inflation. Even in a closed economy, keeping money and exchange rate under control is an improbable mission, but it explains why fiscal restraint is essential: There are just not enough degrees of freedom when most other variables are already pre-determined. Still, the government obtained the financing it required for a number of projects it favored and for its statist development programs, including its export-promotion strategy, at the cost of a higher inflation.
Jorge Garcia Garcia has expressed how this policy mix succeeded in keeping a consensus alive Amostly on false premises@ with some costs but yielding very stable macroeconomic results:
(Nominal) devaluation did not prevent a real appreciation of the peso ....; nor did it favor exporters or protect those sectors that compete with imports. However, it produced an illusion that something had been done in favor of domestic producers. It also contributed to keep inflation high. The public believed that establishing real targets motivated more exports and never questioned whether a relationship existed or not between a trade liberalization and export promotion; and the country maintained (for many years) a very restrictive foreign trade regime. Colombia had a stable economy but a repressed economy. 27 Do Legal Changes Really Matter? Colombia has shown remarkable stability in terms of inflation and public deficits, unparalleled in the continent and with few rivals abroad . A similar record may be claimed in terms of economic growth. 28 As we have seen, budget institutions have A casual observation of Figure 3 shows that the deficits are getting smaller but that there is a cyclical pattern. Governments allow the situation to deteriorate and then they correct it. This may be concluded also from the before and after reform comparison: It appears that periodic reforms are required to build up a morale for deficit slashing, and that this zest will disappear with time, making it necessary for another set of reforms to arouse the orthodox spirit once again. In conclusion, it appears that institutions really matter, but also that governments and the public opinion must keep on working at it because the effectiveness of the rules appears to wane with time. 5 Reforms took place in 1931, 1950, 1963, 1973 and 1980 . The average primary deficit for the 15 years preceding the reforms was 1.11% of GDP and the average primary surplus of the 18 years following the reforms was 0.24% of GDP. The difference of 1.35% of GDP is significant (t=3.61, p=0.0005).
Conclusions
The development of budget institutions in Colombia has spanned a period that starts a few decades after Independence and continues at the present time. It has been a gradual development and, except for the decentralization of government induced by the new Constitution of 1991, which opened a parallel path for local-government institutional development now in its infancy, the process has pointed almost continuously in one direction. The thrust of the institutional building inertia has been to give the central government the power to autonomously determine the outcome of fiscal policy in a democratic setting. The Constitution of 1991 gave new democratic meaning to the budget approval process, and it gave Congress more power than it had in budgetary matters. Nevertheless at present time, the Colombian government has the institutions and mechanisms that ensure that it controls the fiscal outcome and may be held responsible for them, despite the political pressures involved in the budget approval and fiscal policy formation processes. With the budget rules that now exist and given the authority of the central government in budgetary affairs, coupled with central bank independence, no modern-day Minister of Finance can come out --as others have done in the past --and blame Congress, the judiciary, the decentralized system of government or revenue-sharing, for the expansion of public spending or for the budget outcome of a given year. On the contrary, public opinion can and will hold the government totally responsible for the fiscal results because it has empowered it with the tools necessary for good fiscal management.
These are mainly derived from the legal rules and institutions that govern the budget formation, approval and execution process in which the government has been given the upper hand.
The principal feature of this legal framework is the independence of the central bank because this assures that government cannot appropriate an inflation tax to finance deficits or to subsidize the private sector. Then, there is the required concordance of the budget size and distribution with a macroeconomic program in the design of which the central bank has played a key role in coordination with government. This provides the fiscal restraint that is often sought when "balanced-budget rules" are imposed without the hindrances derived from those rules. Additionally, if the President is fiscally responsible, the Ministry of Finance in Colombia has greater power than the spending ministries in the budget formation process because it can impose its authority in the final count when the budget is taken to Congress for approval and because the budget formation process is biased to give more power to this Ministry and the Planning Department in setting targets and in ultimately allocating expenditures. Moreover, Congress, although empowered with the authority to approve the budget, cannot increase expenditures without the express authorization of the Minister of Finance, nor can it threaten the government refusing to approve the budget because in this event, the government can impose by decree the budget proposal it took to Congress. After the budget is approved, the Minister of Finance can ask Congress for new taxes to balance the fiscal result. If these taxes are not approved, the Ministry of Finance is entitled to cut the expenditures until equilibrium is achieved. During the execution of the budget, no major changes between items can be effected and budget increases are prohibited without congressional authorization, except in the cases when a state of emergency can be legitimately invoked. The maximum authority that sets the monthly targets for spending and determines the cash flow is CONFIS --a Ministry of Finance dependency. The management of the cash flow is essentially the most important fiscal management tool because it is what in the end determines the budget execution, and it is dominated by Finance. In short, this Ministry is equipped with all the mechanisms that insure the fiscal results against negative shocks derived from congressional and political actions inside and outside the executive, with the sole exception of those coming from the Presidency. It also has the tools to react to adverse shocks derived from international markets or acts of nature. Additionally, the government also has tools to deal with positive shocks. The new budget organic law introduced two new principles to the process of budget formation: macroeconomic coherence and homeostasis. According to the first, the government is entitled to cut expenditures when the macroeconomic environment requires it to do so; the second principle of self-regulation gives the government the possibility of creating stabilization funds when the revenues exceed the absorption capacity of the economy in instances like the forthcoming boom of oil resources. Many of these "nice features" of the budget process have been the work of the Barco and Gaviria administrations. The Samper government has also improved the system by promoting a law that has been approved and will allow the government to create and operate an oil stabilization fund.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the process is that there are sound economic reasons behind the political backing that orthodox fiscal policy has received in Colombia. The maintenance of a small public sector deficit has helped Colombia to maintain a stable and competitive real exchange rate, it has contributed to avoid large swings in the current account balance and to maintain it within sustainable levels and has been a key factor to avoid substantial increases in foreign indebtedness, which would have brought down the trade balance and added to the appreciation of the currency. Furthermore, the political economy of fiscal management in Colombia can be enriched if it is taken into consideration that public investment is not a complement of private investment, but rather an undesirable substitute; and that in Colombia growth does not suffer considerably when the government has to reduce its investment to accommodate fiscal adjustment programs. This is particularly critical because it may be an indication that despite all the procedures that act in favor of reduced deficits, there are no institutions that would control the quality and effectiveness of public spending.
The analysis of the political economy of fiscal and macroeconomic policy since 1967 yields several interesting conclusions. First, it provides a political framework to explain why Colombians prefer to control public expenditures than to let them run amok. A careful management of public deficits yields a more stable macroeconomic performance, which tends to benefit the private sector and gets its support. Since there are no active competing constituencies with oppositing objectives, this policy has been more easily maintained than in countries where populism was organized as a political party or where political factions had stronger claims on the budget. Inflation was kept at its moderately high levels during many years, without any serious attempts to reduce it on a permanent basis, because there was a monetary financing of the --mostly--moderate deficits; and the private sector tolerated the predictable level of moderately high inflation in exchange for cheaper credit and a stable real exchange rate. The policies were successful to the extent that they yielded stability and moderate growth. Time will tell if economic management in the more open economy that was started in 1991 will be able to yield better results. So far, it is already noticeable that in an open economy the government has to apply even tighter fiscal restraint if it is expected to continue providing price and real exchange rate stability.
